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THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS AND THE ALL WRITS ACT
by
Griffin B. Bell*
The peremptory common-law writs are among the most
potent weapons in the judicial arsenal.'

T

HE ADMINISTRATION of the All Writs Act' by the appellate

courts is a subject of increasing importance. The obverse to sound
decisional doctrines for use in granting or denying relief under the Act
may be a proliferation of split appeals with ensuing trial delays. This
would be contrary to "the notion that appellate review should be post-

poned, except in certain narrowly defined circumstances, until after final
judgment has been rendered by the trial court."' In any event, the deployment of the power vested in the courts under the Act is an integral and
developing part of the appellate process.
Some commentators have been critical of the erosion of trial court
power through the processes of the appellate courts. This erosion is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the evolution of the concept of supervisory powers of federal appellate courts over the trial courts. These supervisory powers, in large measure, flow from the expanding utilization
of the All Writs Act and, in the main, are manifested in piecemeal appeals
under the guise of mandamus.! The issue is no longer one of power, but
* United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit.

'Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967).
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court
which has jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 16SI (1964).
3 389 U.S. at 96.
4 L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 380 (1930); Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE
L.J. 482 (1956); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 7Jl
(1957).
' The other important use of the All Writs Act is in the granting of injunctions pending appeal.
Since sound rules have been developed for granting such relief, no problems are apparent in the
administration of this power by the appellate courts. The rule used in the Fifth Circuit was announced in Greene v. Fair, 314 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1963). "Unless an appellant can demonstrate
to the court on such an emergency motion as this [for injunction pending appeal] that there is great
likelihood, approaching near certainty, that he will prevail when his case finally comes to be heard
on the merits, he does not meet the standard which all courts recognize must be reached to warrant
the entering of an emergency order of this kind." Id. at 202. See also United States v. Lynd, 301
F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1962). A similar rule appears to have been enforced by the Sixth Circuit in
Dunn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F.2d 873 (6th Cir. 1962). That court stated that it would
not enjoin the union from picketing pending appeal where there was doubt whether the employer
would ultimately prevail.
The attitude in several other circuits is that injunctions are to be issued pending appeal only in
order to preserve jurisdiction. See Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 273 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945); cf. UAW v. J.I. Case Co., 281 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.
1960).
The power to stay the enforcement of a judgment pending the outcome of an appeal also had
its origin in the All Writs Act. See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 n.4 (1942).
See also FED. R. A'p. P. 8 (a) on injunctions and stays. The District of Columbia Circuit has listed
four factors to be considered in determining whether to issue a stay: first, whether the party seeking
the stay made a strong showing that it was likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal; second,
whether irreparable injury will result if the stay is not granted; third, whether issuance of a stay
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rather one of propriety.! The decisions reflect the need for a philosophy
of restraint and a policy of comity in the approach of the courts of appeals
toward the district courts.
I.

HISTORY

While the basis for general judicial supervision over inferior courts
through extraordinary or peremptory writs can be found in early common
law, the All Writs Act is a direct descendant of the Judiciary Act of
1789. 7 Section 14 of that Act granted federal courts the power to issue extraordinary writs in aid of their respective jurisdiction. And while it is
clear that the All Writs Act authorizes the issuance of the traditional
common law writs of mandamus and prohibition,8 the phrase "all writs"
also encompasses common law certiorari,9 injunctions,"0 subpoenas,' writs
of ne exeat," writs of habeas corpus, 3 and all other writs "necessary or
appropriate" in aid of jurisdiction."
Traditionally the writs of mandamus and prohibition, by keeping a case
in reviewable posture, have served to prevent an inferior court from
wrongfully assuming jurisdiction," or to compel it to exercise jurisdiction
where indicated. " Although Congress, through the habeas corpus statutes,
has not conferred original jurisdiction upon courts of appeals to issue original writs of habeas corpus, these courts under the All Writs Act have
power to grant an auxiliary writ of habeas corpus in aid of their appellate
jurisdiction."
Choosing the correct writ to obtain the desired relief is no longer necessary in the federal courts."8 Different writs may be sought alternatively or
cumulatively; 9 the choice is now unimportant."0 The subtle distinctions
among the various writs have no effect on their relative usefulness as vehicles for interlocutory review."
would substantially harm other parties; and fourth, whether the public interest is involved. Virginia
Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
6 See LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
S1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789); see In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 177 (ist Cir. 1954).
'See United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945). See also 6 J.
54.10[2] (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
'See, e.g., United States v. Beatty, 232 U.S. 463 (1914). See also 6 MOORE 5 54.10[2].
'0 See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d
818 (5th Cir. 1962).
" See e.g., Bethlehem Ship Building Corp. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1941).
12 See, e.g., Judson v. Judson, 8 F.R.D. 336 (D.D.C. 1943).
"See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)
(writ to produce prisoner for hearing). See also 6 MOORE 5 54.10[2] n.8.
"See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
* See Ex parte Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 273, 275 (1921).
"Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1943). See generally 6 MOORE
54.10[4]; R. SoROL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS § 8.5 (2d ed. 1969); cf. FED. R. APP. P. 22.
8
See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
806 (1953).
19See, e.g., In re Rice, 155 U.S. 396 (1894). See generally 6 MooRE
54.10[2].
2°See Ex parte Simons, 247 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1918).
" See generally Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEXAS L. REV. 126 (1926).
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5
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JURISDICTION

The jurisdictional prerequisite for application of the All Writs Act is
simply that the writ be necessary or appropriate in aid of the jurisdiction
of the issuing court." The Supreme Court in LaBuy v. Howes Leather
Co."5 explained the power of the courts of appeals under the Act: "The
question of naked power has long been settled by this Court .... Since the
Court of Appeals could at some stage of the . . . proceedings entertain appeals in these cases, it has power in proper circumstances . . .to issue writs

of mandamus reaching them."' This is an expression of prospective or
concurrent appellate jurisdiction. The power of the courts of appeals to
issue writs is not limited to cases where an appeal has already been filed.
Rather, this power of review extends to all proceedings where the actions
of the trial judge at some future stage of the litigation might be reviewable.
The Supreme Court's pronouncement in LaBuy put aside the narrow
construction of the All Writs Act previously advanced in several circuits
that writs properly could issue only when appellate review otherwise would
be defeated." After LaBuy, the availability or non-availability of alternative means of appellate review would appear to be irrelevant to a finding
of jurisdiction or power in the court of appeals. Indeed, the Supreme Court
in Will v. United States,2 a criminal prosecution for tax evasion, found
that since the Government lacked a method of securing appellate review,
the court of appeals was precluded from exercising authority under the
All Writs Act. The Court noted that Congress has limited appeal by the
Government in criminal cases to narrow categories of orders terminating
the prosecution. The opinion continued: "This Court cannot and will not
grant the Government a right of review which Congress has chosen to
withhold."" Simply stated, in that case the court of appeals had neither
actual nor potential jurisdiction."
In sum, under the expansive interpretation of the All Writs Act by the
Supreme Court in LaBuy, the overriding question left to the courts of appeals upon petition for an extraordinary writ is no longer one of power,
but rather the propriety of exercising the power conferred by the Act.
III. PROPRIETY CONSIDERATIONS

A. An Extraordinary Remedy for Extraordinary Circumstances
Review under the All Writs Act is reserved for narrowly defined cir22

See note 2 supra.
U.S. 249 (1957).

23352

241d. at 255.
2 See General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1966); CMAX, Inc. v.
Hall, 290 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1961); In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954).
2a389 U.S. 90 (1967).
27Id. at 97 n.5 (citing Carrol v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 407-08 (1957)).
28 The Second Circuit reached the same result using the same reasoning in United States v. Bondy,
171 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1948). However, the First Circuit in In re United States, 348 F.2d 624

(1st Cir. 1965), issued mandamus in a similar situation, reasoning that a pretrial order in a criminal
case could be challenged by a contempt proceeding or by dismissal of the indictment. The court
there stated: "We see no reason why the government should not be able to do directly what itcould
Vffectuate indirectly." Id. at 625,
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cumstances." The Supreme Court, in the often-cited case of Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Ass'n," emphasized this point, saying: "[W]hile a function of mandamus in aid of appellate jurisdiction is to remove obstacles to
appeal, it may not appropriately be used merely as a substitute for the appeal procedure prescribed by the statute."'" When considering a petition

for a peremptory common-law writ, the courts of appeals traditionally
begin by echoing the directive given by Mr. Justice Jackson in Ex parte
Fahey:" "Mandamus, prohibition and injunction against judges are drastic
and extraordinary remedies ....
These remedies should be resorted to only
where appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy. We are unwilling to utilize
them as substitutes for appeals. As extraordinary remedies, they are reA3'
served for really extraordinary causes.'
To say, however, that the All Writs Act is reserved for extraordinary
situations merely begs the question, for the factors which lead an appellate
court to exercise its discretion are the same factors which the court will
describe as extraordinary circumstances. A more meaningful analysis of the
exercise of discretion by the appellate courts under the Act can be accomplished by putting aside the rhetoric of "extraordinary circumstances"
and delving instead into the actual factors which have influenced the
issuance of a writ.
The procedure to be followed in seeking and obtaining relief under the
Act is governed by Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure."
This procedure has two stages: first, the court may summarily deny the
petition; second, if not so denied, an answer to the petition will be required. Only thereafter does the decisional process ensue. There are two
basic factors which influence the court toward denial of relief: a desire to
avoid an affront to the district judge, and the need to prevent piecemeal
appeals (i.e., final judgment rule).
Under the All Writs Act the petitioner initially must overcome a basic
reluctance on the part of the appellate courts to interfere with the trial
court. The Supreme Court has emphasized the problem which arises in the
use of the extraordinary writs, commenting that "they have the unfortunate consequence of making the judge a litigant, obliged to obtain personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of the litigants before him."'
On occasion, this view that the issuance of a writ is a personal affront to
the trial judge, to be avoided if possible, has led courts of appeals to deny
the writ after stating its confidence that the trial judge will comply with
the opinion without the compulsion of a writ."
The Fifth Circuit has noted the difference in degree of confrontation
with the trial judge under a petition for mandamus on the one hand, and
"See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
"°319 U.S. 21 (1943).
31 Id. at 26.
2332 U.S. 258 (1947).

as4 Id. at 260 (emphasis added).

3

FED. R. Apt.

P. 21.
332 U.S. at 260.
8'See, e.g., United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1951); Tennessee v. Taylor,
169 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1948).
35
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a hearing on interlocutory review " on the other. 8 Professor Moore has
suggested that in most cases arising under the All 'Writs Act, the trial
judge, while literally the defendant, is in fact only a formal party who has
no more interest in the result reached by the circuit court than he does in
any appealable question. a" While there may be merit in this observation,
confrontation is still cited as the principal reason for denial of mandamus.
The second consideration militating against exercise of authority under
the Act is the so-called final judgment rule. Although stemming from
early common law,'0 the requirement of a final judgment for review, like
the All Writs Act, has its statutory basis in the Judiciary Act of 1789."'
The purpose of the rule was to promote judicial economy and avoid needless delay and expense generated by split appeals and case fragmentation.
Additional justification for the rule is found in the experience that most
issues presented for interlocutory review either will be resolved or rendered
moot if the trial courts are permitted to proceed uninterrupted to judgment. Although the Supreme Court has relaxed the rigors of the rule
through an expansive definition of a "final" judgment,' and Congress by
statute has provided interlocutory re'view for certain specified orders,"
the final judgment rule remains undaunted as a firm administrative doctrine in the appellate courts.

B. Standards Invoked in the Decisional Process Under the All Writs Act
The appellate courts have fashioned a variety of criteria for use in determining the propriety of granting a requested writ under the Act. Some
of these fall under the label "abuse of discretion." Others, such as the absence of an alternative means of review or the alleviation of expense and
inconvenience, fall into a separate category.
Abuse of Discretion. Traditionally writs under the Act have issued only
"to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.""
In Howes Leather Co. v. LaBuy' the Supreme Court established criteria
for evaluating the district court's action to determine the appropriateness
of an extraordinary writ. In approving the circuit court's issuance of mandamus the Supreme Court spoke in terms of the district court's "abuse of
power" and "clear abuse of discretion." In Will v. United States" the
Court refined these phrases, stating: "it is clear that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the
3'28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
'"Compare In re Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 306 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), with
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bell Marine Serv., Inc., 321 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1963).
36 MOORE 5 539, at 72; see Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965).
40See generally Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEXAS L. REAR.292 (1966);
Note, Mandamus Proceedings in the Federal Courts of Appeal: A Compromise with Finality, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 1036 (1964).
41§ 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (1789).
41 See generally Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (1961).

4328 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964).
"Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
45 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
46 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
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invocation of this extraordinary remedy." It is only through application
by the courts to concrete situations that these vague phrases take on real
meaning.
The criteria of "abuse of power" and "abuse of discretion" were cast
into an area already fraught with vague platitudes and few concrete guidelines. The new terminology was coined in a case arising out of a situation
where Judge LaBuy of the Northern District of Illinois was faced with
two complex and time-consuming antitrust cases. After numerous hearings,
Judge LaBuy, on his own motion, ordered the case to a master under Rule
53 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 The attorneys had estimated the trial would take six weeks. Recognizing that "a reference
should be made only upon a showing that some exceptional conditions require it, ' 41 Judge LaBuy concluded that these circumstances constituted
an "exceptional condition" justifying reference under Rule 53 (b). The
reference to a master was not a final judgment. Although the district
judge's determination was seemingly authorized by Rule 53 (b), the circuit court disagreed with that determination, electing to superimpose its
judgment that such an "exceptional condition" did not exist,0 and the
Supreme Court affirmed."
It would be difficult to describe a mistaken application of a rule as a
"clear abuse of discretion." There should be more, and the Supreme Court
in its opinion attempted to find more in the existence of an established
practice in Judge LaBuy's district of making references to masters. The
Court termed the practice "little less than an abdication of the judicial
function."' 2 Apparently this was an attempt by the Court to cast the decision in the traditional category of jurisdictional error which has long
been within the ambit of mandamus. But the result gave the All Writs Act
a new dimension. A broad reading of LaBuy provides authority for courts
of appeals to control the district courts in their discretionary actions;
indeed the power to supervise if not direct the litigation process."
Nevertheless, the existence of power does not dictate its exercise. Again
the talisman is propriety and the cases must be examined to determine
how the term "abuse of discretion" has been applied.
Appellate courts traditionally have found an abuse of discretion in two
general situations: first, when the action of the district court deprives the
petitioner of a substantial right, and second, when the trial court's action
exceeds that court's "power" or "jurisdiction." For example, a wrongful
denial of trial by jury constitutes sufficient deprivation of a substantial
4'Id. at 95. Actually the term "usurpation of power" was first used by the Court to describe
the action of a district judge to justify the issuance of mandamus in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104, 159 (1964).
4
FED. R. CIrV. P. 53 (b).

49Id.

"0226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955).
5"LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
2Ijd. at 256.
"In In re Watkins, 271 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1959), the court, after stating the adage that a
"mere error" in a ruling by the district court on a matter within its jurisdiction would not justify
the use of the All Writs Act, found "clear abuse of discretion" in the district court's reference of
a matter to a master. Although the court of appeals purported'to rely on LaBuy, there was no indication of a general practice of making such reference.
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right to justify mandamus." Yet the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit on petition for an extraordinary writ in Institutional Drug Distributors, Inc. v. Yankwich s refused to determine whether the petitioner
was entitled to jury trial, reasoning that the question should be reserved
for appeal after final judgment. Challenges to the impartiality of the district judge have also been heard through petitions brought under the Act
on grounds that a substantial right had been denied."6
The greater number of writs have issued when the trial court's action
has been said to amount to "jurisdictional error." In this connection, mandamus has issued to compel an exercise of jurisdiction directed by statute
and, similarly, to prevent a district judge from asserting jurisdiction
where prohibited by statute. "7 Although appellate courts generally refuse
to hear petitions for mandamus when the challenged assertion of jurisdiction depends on a fact determination, s" two circuits have issued the writ
to prevent a district court from hearing a case after erroneously finding
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties. "
In the main, however, the circuit courts use the term "jurisdiction" in
All Writs cases to refer to a district court's "power" to take particular
action under the federal statutes or rules once jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter has been established. Illustrative of the "power"
approach is the Fifth Circuit opinion in Securities & Exchange Comm'n
v. Krentzman, ° where the court of appeals by writ of mandamus ordered
the district judge to direct the referee in a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding to allow the SEC full participation in the hearing. After the SEC
had intervened in the proceeding pursuant to section 208 of the Bankruptcy Act,"' the district court affirmed the refusal of the referee to permit
the SEC to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing. The court of appeals,

however, explained that the district judge had "exercised what he thought
to be a discretionary power which he did not possess under section 208,

which in our opinion makes mandamus appropriate.""2 Appellate courts

have also found district judges to be without "power" to relitigate previously litigated matters, 3 to restrain a party's use of evidence," and to
transfer a case without a hearing."5

The "power" evaluation plays a leading role in the use of mandamus
54 Dairy

Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Burgess v. Williams, 302 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.

1962); In re Watkins, 271 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1959).
55 249 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1957). The LaBuy case also involved a denial of the substantial right
to trial bcfore a court.
s Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963); In reUnion Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,

368 5 7U.S. 927 (1961).
Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942); Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1924).
"See Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 264 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam);
Smith's Transfer Corp. v. Barksdale, 259 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1958); Electrical & Musical Indus.
Ltd. v. Walsh, 249 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
" Holbut Indus., Inc. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1961); Blaw-Knox Co. v. Lederle,
151 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1945).

'0397 F.2d 55 (sth Cir. 1968).
6111 U.S.C. § 608 (1964).
62 397 F.2d at 59.
63

Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961).
Prod. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).

64International

6

Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962).
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to review district court orders granting or denying transfers of cases.

'

The Third Circuit has held that a district court acted beyond its power in
transferring a case to a district where the action could not have been
brought originally, 7 and in another case that the district court was without power to order a transfer without a hearing."' In both cases the circuit
court corrected the errors through writ of mandamus. The circuits differ
as to what constitutes an abuse of discretion in transfer cases, and in one
instance there are conflicting opinions within the same circuit. The Seventh
Circuit in 1955 granted mandamus to order a transfer apparently because
the circuit court simply disagreed with the district judge as to which
forum was more convenient." However, in 1961 the Seventh Circuit stated
that a court of appeals is not privileged to substitute its judgment for
that of the district court upon the propriety of the transfer of a case."
The Eighth Circuit has announced that it will not even hear applications
for mandamus to review transfer orders.7' The First Circuit has limited
mandamus to cases where the ordered transfer to a district outside the circuit would preclude review by that court of appeals.7" Two other circuits have rejected this reasoning, stating that they will issue mandamus
only when the district court action could not be reviewed through an
appeal from a final judgment in any appellate court."'
Since the transfer of a case is expressly discretionary, the argument
against reviewing such transfer orders through proceedings under the All
Writs Act is substantial. As articulately stated by the Third Circuit in
All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli,74 "the risk of a party being injured
either by the granting or refusal of a transfer order is, we think, much
less than the certainty of harm through delay and additional expense if
these orders are to be subjected to interlocutory review by mandamus . . . . " In fact, the Third Circuit has simply restated the basis for the
final judgment rule."
It is apparent that the All Writs Act is becoming a basis for an interlocutory appeals system." This can be seen in the increasing review of discovery orders by means of mandamus petitions. In Hartley Pen Co. v.

United States"' mandamus issued to direct a district court to vacate its
6628 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
7

(1964).

Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court reversed, 376 U.S.
612 (1964), finding that the action could have been brought originally in the transferee district.
However, the Supreme Court did not question the Third Circuit's use of mandamus in this situation.
68Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962).
"9Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 822 (1955).
"°Chemetron Corp. v. Perry, 295 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1961).
7" Great N. Ry. v. Hyde, 238 F.2d 852, 857 (8th Cir. 1956).
2In
re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954). This arises when the transferee district is
outside the circuit.
'3 See Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951);
Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950).
74 196 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952).
Id. at 1011-12.
76 On the other hand, in 1966 the Supreme Court not only upheld the Fifth Circuit's review
through a petition for mandamus of a district judge's denial of a section 1404 transfer motion,
but in so doing also found that the court of appeals was empowered to transfer the case by direct
order. Koehring v. Hyde Constr. Co., 382 U.S. 362 (1966).
77See American Flyers Airline Corp. v. Farrell, 385 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1967).
7s287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961).
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order authorizing discovery of trade secrets held by petitioner. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the trial judge had committed gross abuse of discretion which would result in irreparable harm
to the petitioner. The Fifth Circuit in Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Carpenter" expressly stated that from the record it could not find such an
abuse of discretion in the trial court's discovery order as would justify
issuance of a writ of mandamus. Yet the circuit court ordered the district
court to reconsider its order after a full hearing on the existence vel non
of trade secrets in the matter to be discovered. This quasi or half-a-loaf
reversal is noteworthy. It is a middle ground designed perhaps as a remedy
where a finding of abuse of discretion could not be sustained.
These discovery decisions must be measured by the observation of Professor Wright:
The central feature of modern procedural reform is that trial courts are given
discretion to decide details of procedure which in the past have been governed
by rigid statutes. . . . It is terrifying to think of the consequences, to the
discovery process, to the appellate courts, and to the cause of efficient judicial administration, if litigation is to be suspended by an application for writ
of mandamus every time one side or the other believes that the trial judge
has made a mistake in applying the discovery rules."0
Alternative Means of Review. There are other considerations which sometimes motivate appellate courts to grant review through the All Writs Act.
One is the non-availability of an alternative method of review, such as an
appeal from final judgment.81 While this consideration does not go to the
appellate court's power under the Act, as discussed above, it may influence
the resolution of whether the power should be exercised.
Such is the case when a district judge effectively denies a requested injunction simply by declining to rule on a plaintiff's motion. There is no
order to review and the only remedy available is to petition the circuit
court for an extraordinary writ, such as an injunction pending appeal. 2
A similar situation is presented when a district court stays proceedings in
a suit for an injunction pending resolution of the same claim in a state
court. The practical result of the stay is denial of the preliminary injunction with no available means of appeal except through the Act.
Such is also the case when a defendant in a state criminal prosecution
successfully removes the case to the federal district court. There is no provision for the state to appeal the denial of a motion to remand to the state
court. It can challenge the federal court's ruling only by means of a petition for an extraordinary writ. The interest of the state in conducting the
trial in its own courts and the unavailability of appeal have been held to
justify relief in the appellate courts under the All Writs Act. 2
Conversely, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have found the statutory cer79387 F.2d 529 (sth Cir. 1967).
88

Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 775-76
(1957).
81See, e.g., Bartsch v. Clarke, 293 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1961).
82See generally Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351, 369 (1961).
83See, e.g., Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
However, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)

(1964)

does provide that an order remanding a case to the state
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tification procedure' to be a potentially effective alternative method of
review and have denied motions for relief under the Act where the coms5
plaining party has not first sought certification from the district court.
However, the Second Circuit in Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping
Corp." held that the mere denial by a district judge of a motion for certification did not preclude the appellate court from considering a petition
under the Act. The crux of the Second Circuit decision was that the certification procedure was not intended to supplant the All Writs Act. While
the actual holding in Japan Line does not conflict with the earlier decisions
of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, some of the language in the opinion
raises considerable doubt as to whether the Second Circuit would have
taken the exhaustion of remedies approach outlined in the earlier cases even
if the aggrieved party had not moved for certification below. 7
Expense and Inconvenience. Just as there is doubt about the necessity of a
motion for certification in order subsequently to obtain an extraordinary
writ, there is also uncertainty regarding the premise that the expense and
inconvenience of waiting for appeal from final judgment is a basis for
relief under the All Writs Act. This uncertainty is attributable to the
Supreme Court statement in Roche that the inconvenience of a potentially
useless trial "is one which we must take it Congress contemplated in providing that only final judgments should be reviewable."" However, the
Seventh Circuit in Howes Leather Co. v. LaBuy" found a basis for mandamus in "the necessity and great expense of protracted trials which conceivably may eventually lead nowhere but to a complete retrial of the
causes before a competent tribunal.""' Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Hughes" paid lip service to the Roche policy that the Act
is not to be used "to alleviate the hardship resulting from an unnecessary
trial in a particular case." 92 However, in the next paragraph of the opinion,
the court cited the inconvenience of continuing the trial to final judgment
as justification for granting the petition, commenting that "the trial of
the present case and similar cases would be lengthy and expensive, causing a heavy burden on the litigants and a drain on judicial manpower." 3

C. Supervisory Function
The decisions indicate a trend toward more interim supervision by the
appellate courts over the litigation process. In United States v. Hughes, for
court from which it was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1443 (1964) is reviewable by appeal
and otherwise.
1428 U.S.C. S 1292(b) (1964).
(per curiam); Allstate Ins.
5In re Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 306 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1962)
Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 264 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1959). Compare the procedure outlined in
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) with that provided for in FEn. R. Crv. P. 54(b).
s407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969).
97
d. at 175.
88 319 U.S. at 30.
89226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 249 (1957). See note 23
supra, and accompanying text.
90226 F.2d at 712.
91413 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1969).
92id.
9Id.
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instance, the Fifth Circuit held mandamus to be an appropriate vehicle
for review of a district judge's construction of a recently promulgated discovery provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In this criminal antitrust prosecution, defendants had filed pre-trial motions for
discovery under Rule 16," including motions to discover grand jury testimony. By these motions the defendant sought production of grand jury
testimony of all present and former officers and employees of the corporate defendants. The district court responded with an order allowing
the corporate defendants to discover only the testimony of corporate officers. Both the Government and the defendants petitioned the court of appeals for writs of mandamus against the order as an improper construction of Rule 16, the Government contending it was too broad and the
defendants arguing it was not broad enough. The court of appeals, asserting reliance upon the Supreme Court decisions in LaBuy and Schlagenhauf
v. Holder," held mandamus to be an appropriate remedy. The result was
full blown appellate review of an issue at the discovery stage, albeit an
issue of first impression in the court.
The Fifth Circuit was armed in its decision with the Supreme Court's
reaffirmation in LaBuy that proper judicial administration requires supervisory control of the district courts by the courts of appeals and that in
proper circumstances such supervisory authority might be exercised
through extraordinary means. In Hughes the court noted that the issues
presented to the district court had not yet been considered by the court of
appeals and that the district courts within the circuit were in conflict over
this question. The court then simply stated "the exercise of our 'expository
and supervisory functions' will limit further disparity.""
The Fourth Circuit through mandamus has directed the transfer of an
antitrust case relying on the supervisory authority that it understood
LaBuy to confer, noting:
We are not concerned here only with rights of private litigants which we
feel in any event will not be impaired in the least by transfer. Nor are we
concerned only with the problem of whether or not we shall ultimately lose
our jurisdiction to review to another appellate court. Rather, our interest is
with97the effective administration and supervision of the courts of our circuit.
The Supreme Court, however, abandoned the language of "supervisory
control" in Schlagenhauf and emphasized instead "the substantial allegation of usurpation of power." Yet the facts of Schlagenhauf actually show
no intention on the part of the Court to retreat from LaBuy. District
Judge Holder ordered a physical and mental examination of a defendant
under Federal Rule 35." The defendant petitioned the Seventh Circuit for
writ of mandamus directing the district judge to vacate the order on the
ground that petitioner's mental and physical condition was not "in con4

9 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.

95379 U.S. 104 (1964).
9"413 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1969).
" General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
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troversy" and alleging that "good cause" for the order had not been
shown, both being expressly required by Rule 35. The Seventh Circuit
issued the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, placing heavy reliance on the
fact that the district court's order was the first of its kind and that, therefore, the question was undecided. Thus the situation in Schlagenhauf
was analogous to that faced by the Fifth Circuit in Hughes and the motivation for issuing the requested writ was quite similar.
The Hughes decision may or may not be in conflict with the most recent Supreme Court case involving the All Writs Act and the LaBuy
and Schlagenhauf opinions. In a footnote to the opinion in Will v.United
States,"0 Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated that LaBuy "is simply inapposite
where there is no showing of a persistent disregard of the federal rules."'' .
He then went on to interpret Schlagenhauf, saying that although the Court
in that opinion did note that the questions concerning the construction of
Rule 3 5 were new and substantial, the Court "rested the existence of mandamus jurisdiction squarely on the fact that there was real doubt whether
the District Court had any
power at all to order a defendant to submit to
I
a physical examination.''
But "usurpation of power" is just another phrase to be applied by the
courts of appeals. Indeed, vague phrases are apt to turn into dangerous
tools unless due restraint is exercised by the appellate courts. As the Supreme Court warned in Will: "Courts faced with petitions for the peremptory writs must be careful lest they suffer themselves to be misled by
labels such as 'abuse of discretion' and 'want of power' into interlocutory
review of nonappealable
orders on the mere ground that they may be
02
erroneous.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

There is scarcely a procedural area in the appellate courts where the
need for judicial restraint is greater than in the administration of the All
Writs Act. There is frequently great weakness in an excess of power. The
resources of the appellate courts are already heavily taxed with appeals
from final judgments. Since these courts are hardly equal to the task of directing the trial process though interlocutory appeals, relief under the All
Writs Act must be sparingly granted. Such a philosophy may be a sounder
approach than efforts to follow catch phrases such as "usurpation of
power," "abuse of discretion," and the like. The philosophy of the comity
doctrine as it exists in the federal-state courts relationship may be adapted
to administration of the federal peremptory writs power. The intrusion into
the trial process by the appellate courts is one to be avoided except in the
most compelling circumstances.

99 389 U.S. 90 (1967).

00Id. at 104 n.14.
Id.

101

102Id. at 98.
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